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From Control to Chaos 
 
Richard W. Hurd 
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I. Introduction 
Much of the research on union democracy and almost all of the press coverage focuses on 
abuses of power at the top of the organization. I look at a case at the opposite end of the democracy 
spectrum. After an insurgent challenge to an established executive director toppled him from power, 
the chaos of democracy was unleashed in this small union of professional workers. The turmoil 
experienced by this organization for most of the past decade demonstrates that the democracy dilemma 
in unions cannot be successfully resolved by effective use of the democratic process alone and raises 
tentative questions about the bottom-up, rank-and-file insurgency approach to union transformation. 
Section II reviews relevant research on union democracy and the democracy dilemma. Section III 
looks at attributes of professional workers and the implications for unions that represent them. Section 
IV summarizes the experiences of the League of Creative Artists, a fictitious name for a real union going 
through a democracy crisis. The final section offers a brief analysis and suggests possible implications. 
II. Union Democracy 
There is general agreement among labor relations scholars that union democracy has positive 
benefits. To some extent support for democracy is based on values — in a democratic society the 
leaders of an organization that speaks for workers should be selected by those workers both for 
credibility and because it is right. There also are perceived practical benefits as explained by George 
Strauss in an overview article, "Union democracy is desirable... because on balance democracy increases 
union effectiveness in representing members' interests and in mobilizing these members to support its 
collective bargaining objectives" (Strauss, 1991, p. 201). 
While there is broad acceptance of democracy as an ideal, there is also ample evidence that 
unions share with other bureaucratic organizations a tendency towards oligarchy. At both the national 
and local levels, the expertise of experienced leaders and staff combines with control over the 
machinery of the union's operating and communications system to create inertia which perpetuates 
control by an individual officer, a clique, or even a family. Although oligarchies often are viewed with 
disdain, a reason- able case can be made that efficient operation, bargaining effectiveness, and political 
influence are enhanced by concentrated authority and continuity in leadership. 
More than half a century ago Herberg identified a "curious paradox" which has come to be 
known as the democracy dilemma. On the one hand, a labor union is "a businesslike service 
organization" which represents members' interests in the bargaining and political arenas. On the other 
hand, a labor union is a "vehicle for democratic self determination" (Herberg, 1943, pp. 405-6). The first 
role is filled best by a tightly controlled operation, consistent with oligarchy. The second role cries out 
for a participatory process akin to town meeting democracy. Herberg believes that oligarchy wins out in  
most unions with the complicity of the members: "By and large, the members are quite satisfied to have 
it so — as long as things go well and they receive... proper service and protection" (Herberg, 1943, p. 
411). 
As unions' role as "a businesslike service organization" has expanded over time, so has the 
involvement of staff in decision making especially at the national level. In many unions, key staff (other 
than those in specialized roles such as accounting, research, or legal affairs) are former rank-and-file 
members and local union leaders. It is not uncommon for these home-grown experts in bargaining, 
arbitration, organizing, or union administration to spend many years on staff influencing policy, only to 
move later into an elected national office where they set policy. In other unions which restrict office 
holding to members, a powerful leader may arrange for a trusted aide or relative to work in a union 
shop temporarily in order to qualify for a run at elective office. 
Some unions, including HERE, SEIU and UFCW, do away with niceties and simply allow staff to 
run for office at all levels. It is not unusual for local presidents or national officers in these unions to be 
career union staffers who have never worked in the occupation or industry. This does not necessarily 
undermine democracy so long as the former staff members assume office only after an open and fair 
election. The point is that the tendency towards oligarchy is reinforced by the increased size of the 
bureaucracy and by the election of career union bureaucrats to leadership positions. 
There is a real temptation to equate union oligarchies with conservative business unionism, and 
especially with its insurance agent or servicing model orientation. However, this misconstrues the reality 
that unions controlled at the top can be either right wing or left wing, as Fraser (1998) effectively 
demonstrates. He weaves an explanation which posits union power as the central ingredient to 
progressive change and suggests that some highly respected tacticians in the organizing arena consider 
democracy "a hindrance where a state of undeclared war against employers demands discipline, secrecy 
and decisive action" (Fraser, 1998, p.38). 
Fraser accepts the necessity of foregoing democracy in pursuit of an organizing offensive which 
is the essential core of labor's revival. Others who share Fraser's dream of a transformed, more militant, 
and leftist movement disagree with his conclusion. Aronowitz argues that Fraser is simply wrong 
because "unions are best able to wage class warfare when the rank and file has sovereign control over 
its basic decisions" (Aronowitz, 1998, p. 84). Similarly, Eisenscher contents that democracy is crucial to 
transformation: "The engine of labor renewal is the creation of a movement for democratic participation 
by union members" (Eisenscher, 1999, p. 228). 
The debate around union democracy has been rejoined only recently, particularly in reaction to 
the ascension of John Sweeney to the presidency of the AFL-CIO (Moody, 1998) and to the court 
removal of Ron Carey as president of the Teamsters (Beizer and Hurd, 1999). A foray into historical 
literature on the subject sheds some light and helps decipher some of the conflicting messages about 
democracy emanating both from academia and from the labor movement itself. 
In a 1978 book, Hemingway presents a detailed look at three British unions and offers 
compelling evidence that democracy is indeed a dilemma. Electoral challenges, caucuses, and organized 
opposition may be evidence of vibrant democracy, but they also introduce political conflict into the life 
of the union. In practice, then, the dilemma is not simply a choice between oligarchy and grassroots 
democracy. It is also a choice between control and conflict which are "opposite sides of the same coin." 
And electoral conflict does not go away after the votes are counted: "either side may subsequently 
make fresh challenges as issues and resources change . . . the coin can be spun again and again" 
(Hemingway, 1978, pp. 11-12). 
This conclusion does not lead Hemingway to oppose rank-and-file democracy. Rather, he simply 
confirms that there are no easy answers: "How are we to choose between leaders who emphasize 
efficient organization at the risk of losing freedom to differ, and members who demand more control 
from below at the risk of fragmentation and disunity? . . . The [union] governmental process is more 
complex and problematic than we are lead to believe by the theorists" (Hemingway, 1978, p. 176).  
Tannenbaum and Kahn (1958) study the practice of democracy in local unions in the U.S. and 
focus on the level of control exercised over the internal operations of the union. Four prototypes are 
described: autocratic (high control at the top), democratic (high control among members), polyarchic 
(high control at all levels), and anarchistic (low control at all levels). There is a direct relationship 
between the total amount of control exercised within a local and its power relative to the external 
environment: "A lot of control in a weak organization may not be nearly so satisfying as a little control in 
a strong organization" (Tannenbaum and Kahn, 1958, p. 179). 
Interestingly, member activism is high in those organizations with high levels of control whether 
it is exercised by leaders (autocratic), by members (democratic), or is shared (polyarchic). This is 
reasonable, especially since internal control and external power seem to be closely aligned. And this fits 
with Herberg's observation noted earlier that members accept oligarchy so long as the union performs 
its representational functions effectively. Tannenbaum and Kahn conclude, "In the typical evaluation of 
democracy in [labor] organizations great emphasis is placed on the distribution of control and all too 
little on the total amount of control exercised" (1958, p. 237). 
The purpose of this section has been not to resolve the democracy dilemma, but rather to 
explore its complexity. As unions struggle with the challenges of transformation, they also confront the 
limitations of their own internal political cultures. Some unions are controlled by elected leaders, others 
are effectively run by staff, and others are reasonably democratic. Some unions exhibit relatively high 
levels of member activism, while in others members are apathetic. The question of whether democratic 
unions are more effective than oligarchic ones has no straightforward answer, nor does the question of 
the most appropriate form to pave the way for revitalization. As we tum to a discussion of the practice 
of democracy in unions of professional workers, keep in mind the range of issues this entails, I return to 
the concepts covered in this section when I analyze the case study later in the paper. 
III. Professional Workers, Unions, and Democracy 
Professional workers' attitudes towards unions are ambivalent. There is a degree of elitism 
among professionals who take great pride in their abilities, intelligence, and accomplishments. There is a 
related tendency to look askance at unions as institutions better suited to the gritty world of blue-collar 
and low-wage service work. At the same time professional workers who feel that they are not given the 
respect that they deserve are self-confident enough to stand up and demand redress. Frequently, 
especially where there is a collection of professionals in the same workplace, this involves joining 
together in an association or a union. Professionals with no particular complaint may also join together 
with their peers and form organizations in order to network and to advance their careers. 
The net result is that professionals are slightly more likely than average to belong to unions, 
with 19.5 percent density in 1998; in fact with 3.4 million members, the absolute number of 
professionals in unions exceeds any other broad occupational group (Hirsch and Macpherson, t999, p. 
54). The figures are a bit misleading, however, since about 70 percent of these union members are 
teachers, and most other concentrations of professional unionization are in public sector occupations 
such as social workers and librarians (Ibid., pp. 54-6). There are some private sector professions with 
notable union activity such as those in entertainment, healthcare, and sports. There are also several 
technical occupations in transportation with established unions including pilots and air traffic 
controllers. 
The equivocal stance of professional workers towards unions plays itself out internally. For 
example, at an annual leadership training institute for the New York State United Teachers (NYSLTT, an 
AFT affiliate) a colleague and I conduct a half-day session on strategic planning. In an exercise on 
stakeholders, values, and mission a split inevitably develops between those who believe that NYSUT's 
attention should be on terms and conditions of employment and those who place priority on the 
educational process and the children. This struggle to reconcile union priorities with professional 
objectives is typical. 
The problem escalates when professionals are represented by unions with occupationally 
diverse membership. Local 1199WV, a healthcare union affiliated with SEIU, has a national reputation as 
a progressive organizing union. Its largest unit is composed of professional nurses employed by the state 
of Ohio. This unit isolates itself from the rest of the local, most of whom are nurses aides, kitchen 
workers, and other support staff. The nurses are reluctant to endorse the union's organizing priority and 
feel that they should be treated professionally, for example demanding a lawyer to represent them at 
negotiations (an anathema in 1199WV) (Hettrick, 1995). 
Professionals in unions also have an unusually strong belief that problems can be resolved to 
their benefit if only the correct argument can be concocted. They are confident in their own reasoning 
power, which is a plus in that they are likely to be personally involved in preparation of grievances, but 
which can also be a negative if they question every decision made by union leaders or staff. SEIU Local 
509 represents nearly 10,000 Massachusetts education and social service professional employees. At 
one point in the early 199O's, there were 2,500 outstanding grievances and a five-year period from filing 
to arbitration. Although the backlog was subsequently reduced by a union screening process, the 
members continued to be "very demanding of staff' (Donnelly, 1995) and "extremely litigious . . . filing 
grievances about everything" (Casey, 1995). 
The attitudes of professional workers towards their jobs and employee organizations provide 
important background information which helps to understand feelings about democracy. In a 1997 
survey conducted under the auspices of Cornell University and sponsored in part by the AFL-CIO 
Department for Professional Employees, 1,376 professional and technical workers answered 95 
questions each. The interviewees were randomly selected from seven large units which had recently 
experienced union and management influences during a contested organizing campaign. The seven 
campaigns included two election losses, two union pull backs before a vote, two election wins prior to 
the interviews, and one election win after the interviews. 
The professionals surveyed displayed strong commitment to their work, with 73 percent who 
had been employed in the occupation for 10 years or more and 74 percent who anticipated remaining in 
the occupation at least five years in the future. Job satisfaction was very high at 83 percent, and the top 
reason for the satisfaction was the type of work performed. When asked to identify the work-related 
issue of highest importance, freedom to exercise professional judgment was the first choice with staffing 
issues, procedures to assure fair treatment, and four other choices far behind. When asked what type of 
group activities in which they would participate to address work-related concerns, the top choice (at 90 
percent) was meeting with management to discuss policies. The most widely accepted reason for joining 
a union or other employee organization was to give workers a voice. The picture that emerges of these 
professional workers in the aftermath of a union organizing campaign is quite consistent with the 
posture taken by their unionized peers — they are committed to their professions, confident in their 
own judgement, and interested in having direct influence on decisions which affect them (Hurd, 1998). 
The effect of these attitudes on union democracy is divergent. The commitment to the 
occupation, the job, and the mission of the work itself draws professionals away from their unions. Their 
self confidence and desire to participate in decisions that affect them pull them into the apparatus of 
their unions. Both structure and process are influenced. 
In terms of structure, there is often a clear demarcation between elected leaders and staff. 
Because of the members' strong ties to their work, most of these unions employ full-time staff to 
conduct union business. Although staff members may have experience in the profession, they are at 
least as likely to be hired for their expertise in labor relations, union administration, or organizing. Staff 
are considered to be employees, though, and are not the key decision makers. Elected leaders must be 
members and often return to the profession after a term in office. Elected leaders control decision 
making and have authority over staff. This authority is often delegated, at least in part, to a staff director 
who reports to the union president and executive board. 
Because of the reluctance of professional workers to cede decision-making authority to union 
staff, there is a built-in check which forestalls the oligarchic tendency. Nonetheless, oligarchies do 
evolve as is the case with the AFT. This union has its strength primarily in unionized states, especially in 
large cities. The members confront large educational bureaucracies and the desire for union 
representation tends to outweigh interest in professional concerns. Thus the national union has 
entrenched leaders, allowing for smooth succession at the top. In 1997 when Al Shanker died, his 
protégé Sandra Feldman succeeded him. Subsequently, Feldman picked her long-time assistant Randi 
Weingarten to fill her shoes as head of the United Federation of Teachers in New York City, the national 
union's largest affiliate. True to form, Weingarten was a staff lawyer, not a teacher, whose route to 
elective office was paved (with Feldman's help) by a brief mid-career stint as a social studies teacher in 
Brooklyn (Hartocollis, 1998). 
In contrast, the NEA is a more typical professional workers' union and, as is often the case, 
actually began as a professional association focused exclusively on career issues. Although, like the AFT, 
it has a large staff bureaucracy, the decision-making authority is retained by the members. National 
officers have term limits, voting at annual representative assemblies is by secret ballot, and much of the 
work at the state and local level is conducted by volunteers. In fact the contrast in democratic cultures 
was central to the defeat of the proposed merger between the two organizations in 1998. 
The choreographed AFT merger convention voted nearly unanimously in favor of merger (a 
standard display of oligarchic democracy), but the NEA convention was a raucous affair where 
momentum for rejection seemed to develop on its own. With only 42 percent supporting merger (66.7 
percent was required for passage) the defeat demonstrated clearly that the NEA delegates were not shy 
in ignoring the advice of their national leaders. In an articulate analysis Pizzigati points to concerns 
about democratic process, as delegates argued that the new organization would operate more like the 
AFT than the NEA, pointing specifically to the absence of term limits for officers and the betrayal of "the 
NEA's secret ballot heritage." The opposing pulls of professionalism and unionism also played a role, as 
explained by one delegate who was concerned that the merger would signal "that we are more worried 
about pay and other teacher-centered issues than creating a better educational environment for our 
children" (Pizzigati, 1998, p. 17). 
Although the NEA retains a commitment to democratic form, it is an exercise in representative 
rather than grassroots democracy. Smaller unions of professional and technical workers sometimes 
embody the ideal of rank-and-file control. Perhaps the best example is PATCO, where a rebellion by a 
dissident group known as "choirboys" booted President John Leyden from office and replaced him with 
Robert Poli a year before the ill-fated 1981 strike. The choirboys implemented an internal organizing 
plan which raised membership to 90 percent in the open-shop federal section. Although the 11,000 
members were scattered across the country in over 400 facilities, solidarity was cultivated by organizing 
the units into 73 clusters and establishing seven committees in each cluster devoted principally to strike 
preparation. The level of involvement in the union and the depth of activist democracy was remarkable. 
These professional air traffic controllers were absolutely confident that their strategy and organizational 
strength assured a victory in negotiations with the Federal Aviation Administration. The strike failed not 
because of internal weakness but because the external environment limited the union's power. The 
activists' inability to handle effectively the challenges of coordination with other unions, public relations, 
and political action (PATCO had endorsed Ronald Reagan) resulted in defeat (Hurd, 1986). 
The purpose of reviewing briefly the AFT, NEA, and PATCO cases is twofold. First, there is a 
broad range of experience among professional unions regarding democratic form, ranging from 
oligarchy to grassroots democracy. Second, the cases of NEA and especially PATCO demonstrate that 
professional union democracy clearly interferes with union leaders' ability to set the direction of the 
union, and as in PATCO's case, the results may be disastrous. Although democracy may be a desirable 
ideal, the reality can be complex as the case to which I now tum demonstrates. 
IV. Insurgency at the League of Creative Artists 
My case is a U.S. union representing professional workers. Because the issues addressed are 
confidential and some of the interpretation is qualitative, the organization's name and detailed 
circumstances have been modified to preserve anonymity. The union is small relative to national 
organizations but larger than many multi-unit locals. It is affiliated with a much larger union but retains 
budgetary and strategic autonomy and governs its own affairs. 
The League of Creative Artists (LCA) has 6,000 members in 10 dispersed urban centers. Forty 
percent of the members reside in Rongovia, where the central office is located. The union has collective 
bargaining agreements with 90 different employers, with an average shop size of about 50. The 
professionals who belong to the LCA include those currently active in the field (about two-thirds of the 
members), but also a large number who aspire to employment in the profession, who are retired, or 
who are temporarily employed in an unrelated occupation. In other words, the LCA in essence is both a 
union and a professional association. 
Among the working members are five different professional categories (with share of 
membership in parentheses): lead artisans (30 percent), ensemble artisans (45 percent), lead 
performers (5 percent), ensemble performers (15 percent), and designers (5 percent). Although there 
are exceptions, the typical bargaining unit includes either lead and ensemble artisans, or lead and 
ensemble performers; designers may or may not be in either type of unit. The ensemble members and 
designers are usually long-term employees of a given company, but the leads travel and work on a 
contingency basis. The LCA negotiates typical agreements for ensemble members and designers, 
although the terms vary dramatically across urban areas and even from company to company. The 
contracts for leads set minimum terms and conditions with details negotiated by agents certified by LCA 
who represent the individual lead and work for a commission. 
The union's governing board, called the Assembly, is very large with 150 members; seats are 
assigned proportionately to the 10 urban centers and the five occupational groups. There are six officers 
— a president, three vice presidents, a secretary, and a treasurer. Each of the 10 urban centers has its 
own local board chair, and each of the 90 shops has a steward. All of the positions are elected, and all 
are filled by unpaid volunteers. The paid staff are officially hired by the Assembly. There are an Executive 
Director, five field representatives who bargain and handle grievances, five contract enforcers who 
monitor collective and individual contracts and enforce union security provisions (including dues 
collection), one assistant to the elected officers, and five other office workers. Nearly half of the staff 
have some personal tie to one of the professions the union represents. 
Once considered an important force in the industry, the union's power took a big hit in the early 
1980s when the Reagan administration dramatically cut funding for the arts. Although the industry has 
rebounded over time, and the unions representing other workers at the same employers seem to have 
recouped their losses, LCA is still struggling. This is in part due to a fairly large pool of similarly skilled 
(though less experienced) professionals that has fed an expansion in market share for nonunion 
employers. Lethargy inside of the union is also blamed, especially by activist members. 
In spite of the change in the external environment in the 1980s and the attendant loss of power, 
LCA leaders and Staffelung to long-established routines. The president and most other officers were 
essentially figure-heads; although the names and faces changed over time, many were lead artisans near 
the end of their careers or retired. The Assembly did little more than discuss and approve actions of the 
staff. All Assembly meetings were held in Rongovia, effectively disenfranchising sixty percent of the 
delegates since their travel was not reimbursed. Most of the delegates who lived in Rongovia seemed 
more interested in LCA as a professional association than as a union, and Assembly meetings were 
effectively social gatherings. 
The Executive Director and the five field representatives conducted most of the union's work. 
They established cordial relations with management and were deferential at the negotiating table. 
There was a tendency to accept at face value reports from employers of financial constraints, and there 
was a policy of flexibility to adjust bargaining demands to the circumstances of individual companies. 
The contract enforcers relied on antiquated methods to track compliance and were seldom in a position 
to question with confidence the employer's dues deduction practices. It was common knowledge that 
lead artisans and performers could avoid paying dues with impunity, and many in effect became free 
riders. Toward the end of the 1980s as the labor movement's attention to organizing increased, unions 
with similar membership began to encroach on LCA's jurisdiction. The union's budget was in crisis, and 
rumors circulated that the Executive Director had an extravagant expense account. 
By 1990 antipathy replaced apathy among a subset of members who wanted LCA to attend 
more effectively to its role as a union and take a more aggressive stance in negotiations. Ensemble 
artisans and performers at several companies in Rongovia organized themselves and assumed control of 
their own negotiations, collecting what amounted to local dues to hire a labor lawyer to replace the LCA 
field representative at the table. In three of the urban centers, where the bulk of members worked for 
only two or three employers, the local board assumed more responsibility and also began to act 
independently from the union's central office. 
At about the same time an informal insurgent group of activists began to network. Dis-
enfranchised delegates from outside of Rongovia joined with dissatisfied members in Rongovia to push 
for staff accountability, increased militance, improved contracts, and more effective enforcement. To 
quell the disturbance the Executive Director agreed to fund occasional meetings of the Assembly via 
conference call with a speaker phone hookup in each of the 10 urban centers. The insurgents, though a 
minority, organized themselves (paying huge phone bills in the process out of their own pockets) and 
seized control. 
The insurgent controlled Assembly established a Staff Relations Committee, which in 1992 
dismissed the Executive Director and searched for a replacement. A lawyer who had worked with one on 
the LCA's urban center boards outside of Rongovia was hired. In the first several months he fired two 
field representatives and hired a new director for the contract enforcement department. In the 
meantime, the insurgents persuaded the Assembly to establish an Executive Committee which was filled 
primarily with the architects of the coup. 
The insurgents had used the democratic process skillfully to gain control of LCA and remained 
committed to open discussion and a republican format. Seven years later the Assembly meets every 
three weeks via conference call. Issues are debated, referred to committee, and debated again. 
Meetings often last in excess of three hours. Standard attendance is about half of the 150 delegates. The 
Assembly makes all key decisions and must approve all actions of the Executive Committee. Even all 
collective bargaining agreements must receive approval of the Assembly before going into effect, which 
sometimes delays implementation by weeks or months so that questions raised by individual delegates 
can be resolved. 
Because the delegates often serve on Assembly committees and also as stewards for their own 
shops and on the union's urban center boards, the time commitment of the volunteers is extensive. 
Executive Committee members may devote 40 hours of their own time each week to LCA matters, and 
many of the more active delegates spend 20 hours or more. Not surprisingly there is a high level of 
burnout and turnover. 
Under the new Executive Director there were initially immediate improvements in the 
functioning of the central office. He stabilized the budget by adopting austerity measures, including re-
negotiation of the office lease and a three-year freeze on staff pay. The new director of the contract 
enforcement group computerized the tracking and dues-collection system and brought in an entirely 
new, computer-literate staff. Although difficulties remain, dues collection improved substantially. 
The new Executive Director also assumed leadership of negotiations and adopted a hard-line 
posture at the table. Because no action was taken to increase the union's strength (no external 
organizing, no contract campaigns, no coalition building, no internal organizing) the result was longer, 
more contentious negotiations with little payoff in the form of contract improvements. With 90 
contracts and only five field representatives, a negotiating backlog developed. Now nearly all contracts 
are extended beyond expiration (perpetuating weak terms and language) simply because staff cannot 
catch up. 
The Assembly and, especially, its Executive Committee have been determined to increase staff 
accountability. Their attention has been exclusively on staff failures and weaknesses in central office 
operations (successes and good performance pass with little notice). They have taken a hard line with 
the Executive Director, and he has in turn adopted an autocratic style. Poor performance in the contract 
enforcement department and among support staff is routinely dealt with by immediate dismissal. 
Because of the incredible backlog in negotiations, after the initial removal of two field representatives 
the others escaped the axe, though not the wrath of the Executive Committee. 
The failure of all the changes to improve terms and conditions of employment frustrates the 
elected leaders and the members. They blame the negotiating skills of the Executive Director and the 
field representatives rather than the LCA's lack of power. To address the problem the Assembly has 
established a Bargaining Committee to work with the field representatives. Although the new 
committee has provided useful input from members for key negotiations, it also has added another 
forum where issues can be raised, which has muddied the union's bargaining strategy and further 
slowed the process.  
For its part, the Executive Committee has decided that if it wants matters handled appropriately, 
then it must issue commands to the Executive Director, and even to individual field representatives. 
Although this is sometimes done after a vote of the committee, its individual members also give specific 
orders to staff. This practice has extended to the work of the contract enforcement department as well, 
usually through its director. 
With an autocratic Executive Director and an intrusive Executive Committee, it is not surprising 
that staff morale is low and turnover is high. This has helped LCA weed out poor performers, but 
productive employees have left as well. When two field representatives recently quit in frustration, the 
Staff Relations Committee (after agonizingly lengthy searches conducted with attention to democratic 
process) hired experienced professionals with the potential to help turn the union around. 
One of the two was placed in a position as head negotiator by the Executive Committee after it 
recognized her strategic skills. However, the committee insisted on giving instructions, requiring reports 
on minute decisions and developments at negotiations, and setting strategic direction. The new head 
negotiator had to shelve plans to focus on ways to increase power through internal and external 
organizing because she was issued a decree to concentrate on reducing the negotiating backlog, in part 
by spending more time at the table herself. Combined with the Executive Director's efforts to assert his 
own authority over bargaining, this obtrusive meddling was more than this promising head negotiator 
could tolerate and in consternation she left after only six months. 
As of May 1,1999, the situation at LCA is bleak. The Executive Director refuses to make an 
independent decision for fear that the Executive Committee will simply overrule him. The field 
representatives are stretched thin and at a loss of what to do, especially with the departure of the 
promising head negotiator. Other members of the staff are extremely unhappy, and the most 
productive ones are looking for new jobs elsewhere. A shop of performers in Rongovia decertified LCA 
and went independent; a shop of ensemble artisans in Rongovia would like to decertify, but have not yet 
been able to navigate the legal process to accomplish the task. The two shops are among the LCA's 
largest and highest paid. Two urban center boards outside of Rongovia (accounting for about 10 percent 
of the total working members) are well organized, effective at the local level, and totally disenchanted 
with the central office, the Assembly, and the Executive Committee. A group of lead artisans and 
performers which established its own Assembly committee a few years ago have given up; nearly half of 
the seats in the Assembly reserved for leads are vacant. The elected officers have lost confidence in the 
Executive Director, the field representatives, and other key staff. Staff at all levels complain of micro-
managing by delegates and the assumption of failure. In short, LCA is fractured in many directions. The 
promise of the democratic takeover of the union is all but forgotten, and the state of confusion has 
produced a loss of hope among members. 
V. Analysis 
The process of organizational change usually goes through four stages, as depicted in Figure 1 
(Janssen, 1982). 
 
The first stage is contentment, where the participants in the organization are satisfied with its 
role and performance. This would accurately describe LCA in the period prior to 1980. The second stage 
is dental, where the participants cling to old methods of operation, even though the environment has 
changed and new strategies are needed. This characterizes LCA in the 1980s. Because it is very difficult 
to break away from established institutional procedures, any effort to transform the organization will be 
met with resistance and the stage of confusion will have to be survived. For nearly 10 years LCA has 
been stuck in this stage. With an appropriate vision and strategic plan, the renewal stage is possible and 
the cycle is complete. At this writing, there is no consensus within LCA regarding an appropriate vision, 
and the elected leaders survival mentality has precluded the development of any strategic plan to 
escape the union's dysfunctional morass. 
Although the unfortunate state of LCA presents an intriguing challenge for those promoting 
labor union transformation, my focus is on union democracy. The case demonstrates clearly the 
characteristics of professional workers reviewed in Section in. In effect LCA has played the role of both 
professional association and union. Efforts by activists to prod the organization to become more 
effective as a union have been frustrating at best. This in part can be explained by the insurgents' 
mistaken belief that democratic process and their own desires would be enough to accomplish the task. 
Professional workers' belief in reasoned discourse and democratic process have not served LCA 
well, as the unwieldy Assembly is responsible for many decisions its members are ill equipped to make. 
Furthermore, the willingness of the Executive Committee to tackle day-to-day operational decisions 
(consistent with the broader inclinations of professionals) has interfered with the union's operational 
efficiency and potential success. There seems to be a strong self-confidence in their own analytical 
powers which drives members of the Executive Committee to second guess virtually every decision 
made by the paid staff. Even if the staff professionals all are incompetent (which is not the case), the 
constant intrusion cannot possibly help them to reach their potential. 
In terms of union democracy itself. Section II explores various perspectives on the democracy 
dilemma. At one extreme we have oligarchy, later exemplified by the AFT's efficiency and top-down 
control of the decision-making process. At the other extreme we have democracy, but there really are at 
least two versions. One is representative democracy with a parallel supporting staff bureaucracy such as 
the NEA. The other is rank-and-file democracy where the staff is subservient. Both PATCO and LCA fit 
this model. 
However, to understand the experience of rank-and-file democracy, we must also look at the 
issue of control, both internal and external. PATCO's choirboys established an impressive internal 
control system, convinced the members of its efficacy, and won their active involvement. LCA's 
insurgents, on the other hand, were so focused on democratic process that they bypassed the type of 
solidaristic internal organizing displayed by PATCO. Both organizations totally misjudged the situation 
regarding external control or power. The choirboys overestimated the potential power of their strike 
and in effect self destructed. The LCA insurgents convinced themselves that power could be secured 
simply by cracking down on staff and adopting tough stances at the bargaining table. 
The LCA's lack of power explains why most members have simply bowed out. Yes, there is 
democratic control, but to what end if the union is weak? What grassroots democracy has brought to 
LCA (in the absence of power) is conflict, internal fragmentation, and disunity. And as Hemingway 
suggested, the coin of conflict is being spun again and again. The case even shows signs of devolving into 
Tannenbaum and Kahn's archetype of union democracy where there is low control at all levels,  
appropriately named anarchy. 
Although democracy cannot be dismissed as irrelevant to union transformation based on one 
case, the LCA experience demonstrates by negation how desirable efficient operation of the union's 
administrative function might be; it also illustrates how, when carried to an extreme, democratic 
participation by elected volunteers can destroy potential. Perhaps most crucially we can see the 
importance of strategic perspective. The LCA insurgents (just like the PATCO choirboys) overestimated 
the union's potential power based on partial analysis of the challenges confronting it. Without a clear 
vision of where LCA wanted to go, and a plan to strengthen the commitment of members to the union 
internally and to spread the union's reach by organizing externally, this experiment with union 
democracy was preordained to fail. 
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